We only occasionally comment on national security issues, because most are amply covered elsewhere, by experts with specific knowledge.

In the case of the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) regarding Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the reporting and commentary thereon, there are elements so out of sync that anyone who cares about the safety of this country would be delinquent not to comment.  Knowledge and expertise are not that convincing, and politics is far too evident.

As former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton has written in the Washington Post, "Rarely has a document from the supposedly hidden world of intelligence had such an impact as the National Intelligence Estimate released this week....we not only have a problem interpreting what the mullahs in Tehran are up to, but also a more fundamental problem:  Too much of the intelligence community is engaging in policy formulation rather than 'intelligence' analysis, and too many in Congress and the media are happy about it."

In 2005, the NIE concluded that Iran had a nuclear weapons program.  In 2007, this new NIE concludes that Iran stopped that nuclear weapons program in 2003, supposedly (if one is to believe leaks from unnamed officials) based on "intelligence" intercepts that some Iranian generals were unhappy about curtailment of the program.

The entire argument, which is in the process of breaking out on a scale the subject deserves, may hinge on the seemingly nonsensical meaning of "nuclear weapons program."  Regardless of whatever program, if any, the Iranians halted, for whatever period of time, there is no question that Iran continues to enrich uranium.  Yes, enriched uranium can be used for power generation (which Iran does not urgently need), but enriched uranium is also the fundamental component of those most devastating bombs the world so fears.

Once a country has an ample supply of the stuff that can make everything glow for 10,000 years, the end use is really just a matter of engineering, not to belittle the complexity of that engineering.

It is quite troubling that, as the Wall Street Journal has pointed out, "the NIE's main authors included three State Department officials with previous reputations as 'hyper-partisan anti-Bush officials...'"

It is even more troubling that an official of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said of the NIE to the New York Times, "we are more skeptical.  We don't buy the American analysis 100 percent.  We are not that generous with Iran."  On that, John Bolton is scathing, "When the IAEA is tougher than our analysts, you can bet the farm that someone is pursuing a policy agenda."

Most important, from an intelligence perspective, the Israelis aren't buying the NIE analysis.  Israel is guided by political considerations and is not immune to intelligence mistakes, but Israeli intelligence on Iran must be regarded as the best in the world.

Here's what Yuval Steinitz, who sits on the Israeli Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, told the Washington Times, "Until now, there were no sharp differences in interpretation.  I don't know of any piece of intelligence that supports this conclusion.  It seems to me that this report repeats the mistake of Iraq, but taking it to the opposite conclusion.  We have a lot of very clear and solid intelligence, that to my best understanding, clearly shows that the Iranians are developing nuclear weapons today, as they did two years ago.  This is not a matter of speculation, but this is about solid intelligence."

Whatever its motivations, whatever its accuracy, the NIE and the political debate it has exacerbated may well limit U.S. policy on Iran.  But Iran is a danger to the world, whether through conventional or nuclear weapons in the hands of madmen. 

It may well be left up to Israel to take care of the problem.  It won't be the first time, and, given the current schizophrenic foreign policy direction of this country, it probably won't be the last.