Return to Home
 

 


2002 Supreme Court Docket Summary
— By Thomas Goldstein


2002 Monthly Sittings: Oct | Nov | Dec | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | Summ Rev | Dismissed

October 2002 Case List As of June 26, 2002
Cases decided after argument: 73
Summary reversals: 8
ll Summary affirmances: 5 ll Dismissed cases: 6

—NOVEMBER SITTING—

  • Pierce County v. Guillen (01-1229) (4/29; 11/4, 1/14) (Wash. Sup. Ct.; Rev.; Unan.)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    A federal statute providing that documents submitted by state and local governments to the Department of Transportation in order to obtain federal funding for highway repairs may not be discovered or admitted in federal or state trials is a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
    General Civil, Non-Business, Constitutional
    Opinion: [CT] & Unan.

  • Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (01-7574) (3/18; 11/4, 1/14) (Pa. Sup. Ct.; Aff.; 5-4)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    The Double Jeopardy Clause and the Due Process Clause do not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant when the defendant was initially sentenced to life imprisonment after the capital sentencing jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, the initial conviction is subsequently reversed on appeal, and the defendant is reconvicted.
    Criminal, Non-Business, Constitutional
    Majority: [AS] & WHR, SOC, AMK, CT (Parts I, II, IV, V); & WHR, CT (Part III) [What constitutes an offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee is identical to what constitutes an "offence" for purposes of the Due Process Clause. Therefore, under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona, if the initial capital sentencing jury had voted unanimously for life imprisonment, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar the state from seeking the death penalty on retrial.]
    Concurrence in part and in the judgment: SOC [Apprendi was wrongly decided and the Court should not extend it here.]
    Dissent: [RBG] & JPS, DS, SJB [When the capital sentencing jury deadlocks, the imposition of a life sentence is a final judgment for Double Jeopardy purposes.]

  • Lockyer v. Andrade (01-1127) (4/1; 11/5; 3/5) (CA9; Rev.; 5-4)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    California’s three-strikes law is not cruel and unusual punishment under "clearly established" Supreme Court precedent.
    Criminal, Non-Business, Constitutional
    Majority: [SOC] & WHR, AS, AMK, CT
    Dissent: [DS] & JPS, RBG, SGB [California’s three-strikes law is clearly cruel and unusual punishment.]

  • Ewing v. California (01-6978) (4/1; 11/5; 3/5) (Cal. Ct. App.; Aff.; 5-4)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    California’s three-strikes law does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
    Criminal, Non-Business, Constitutional
    Plurality: [SOC] & WHR, AMK [The sentence is not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.]
    Concurrences: in judgment [AS] [The Eighth Amendment was intended only to proscribe certain modes of punishment, and does not apply to disproportionately long sentences.]
    in judgment
    [CT] [There is no "proportionality" review under the Eighth Amendment.]
    Dissents: [JPS] & DS, RBG, SGB [The Eighth Amendment embraces a proportionality principle that takes into account all of the justifications for penal sanctions; the sentence imposed on the defendant is disproportionate.]
    [SGB] & JPS, DS, RGB [A sentence of 25 years to life is grossly disproportionate to petitioner’s crime of stealing three golf clubs, and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.]

  • Norfolk & Western Rwy. Co. v. Ayers (01-963) (4/1; 11/6, 3/10) (Circuit Court of West Virginia, Kanawha County; Aff.; Unan., 5-4)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    a.  Aworker suffering from asbestosis caused by work-related exposure to asbestos may recover for mental anguish damages resulting from the fear of developing cancer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA).
    b.  Under the FELA, a worker may recover his entire damages from a railroad whose negligence caused an injury, even if other third-parties may be partly responsible for the injury.
    General Civil, Non-Business, Statutory
    Majority: [RBG] & Unan. (Parts I, II, IV); & JPS, AS, DS, CT (Part III)
    Concurrences in part and Dissents in part: [AMK] & WHR, SOC, SGB [FELA and common law do not allow damages for fear of cancer for those who manifest symptoms of another disease that does not itself cause cancer.]
    [SGB] [Would "rule out recovery for fear of disease when the following conditions are met:(1) actual development of the disease can neither be expected nor ruled out for many years;(2) fear of the disease is separately compensable if the disease occurs; and (3) fear of the disease is based upon risks not significantly different in kind from the background risks that all individuals face."]

  • United States v. Recio (01-1184) (5/28; 11/12; 1/21) (CA9; Rev.; 9-0)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    A conspiracy does not automatically terminate when the government frustrates its objective.
    Criminal, Non-Business, Statutory
    Majority: [SGB] & WHR, SOC, AS, AMK, DS, CT, RBG
    Concurrence in part and Dissent in part: [JPS] [Prosecutor in this case failed to timely object to the erroneous jury instruction.]

  • Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue (01-1015) (4/15; 11/12; 3/4) (CA6; Rev.; Unan.)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, the holder of a famous mark may recover damages from imitators for "dilution" of the mark only if the holder can show objective proof of actual economic injury.
    General Civil, Business, Statutory
    Opinion: [JPS] & Unan.
    Concurrence: [AMK] [Evidence showing that the imitation marks will likely
    reduce the famous mark’s capacity to identify and distinguish goods is
    enough to prove dilution under the Act.]

  • Smith v. Doe (01-729) (2/19; 11/13; 3/5) (CA9; Rev.; 6-3)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    A state statute requiring that sex offenders register with public officials and that the offenders be listed in a public registry available on the Internet may be applied to individuals convicted before the statute was enacted without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.
    Civil Rights, Non-Business, Constitutional
    Majority: [AMK] & WHR, SOC, AS, CT
    Concurrences: [CT] [The public dissemination of the registry on the Internet is not required by the statute and therefore is irrelevant to Ex Post Facto analysis]
    in judgment
    [DS] [Whether the Sex Offender Registration Act is a criminal law and therefore subject to Ex Post Facto analysis is a very close question; the presumption of constitutionality usually afforded state laws tips the scales in favor of upholding the law.]
    Dissents: [JPS] [Inclusion in the sex offender registry is part of the punishment the state imposes on sex offenders, and therefore it cannot be applied retroactively under the Ex Post Facto Clause.]
    [RBG] & SGB [The purpose of the Sex Offender Registration Act is punitive, and therefore it cannot be applied retroactively under the Ex Post Facto Clause.]

  • Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe (01-1231) (5/20; 11/13, 3/5) (CA2; Rev; 9-0)
    Decision; Docket; Findlaw
    Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which lists convicted sex offenders in a publicly disseminated registry but does not give offenders the opportunity to prove that they are no longer currently dangerous, does not violate the Due Process Clause.
    Civil Rights, Non-Business, Constitutional
    Majority: [WHR] & SOC, AS, AMK, DS, CT, RBG, SGB
    Concurrences: [AS] [There is no due process violation so long as the state validly enacts the statute.]
    [DS] & RGB [The Connecticut statute may be challenged under "substantive due process" or the Equal Protection Clause.]
    in judgment
    [JPS] [found in dissent to Smith v. Doe] [Constitutionally adequate trial is all that due process requires.]

2002 Monthly Sittings: Oct | Nov | Dec | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | Summ Rev | Dismissed