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Hon. Arlen Specter
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
224 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

A recent story in the Washington Post suggested that it might have been improper for Judge John Roberts to participate on the D.C. Circuit panel that decided the recent case of *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*. The *Post* story relied heavily on a short article written by three professors, Stephen Gillers, David Luban and Steven Lubet, and published on the internet in *slate.com*.

I write to provide perspective on the issues raised by these articles and to make clear that Judge Roberts' participation on the panel was proper. To briefly suggest my background to draw such a conclusion, I have taught and written in the field of legal and judicial ethics for over thirty years. The law school text that I co-author has long been the most widely used in the country, and it covers judicial ethics in considerable detail.

There are several points on which all observers would agree. First, 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires Judge Roberts or any other federal judge to disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The key term, of course, is "reasonably." Anyone could assert that a given judge was not impartial. Indeed, a litigant might be expected to do so whenever he or she preferred to have someone else hear their case. Thus, the statute does not allow litigants (or reporters or professors) to draw a personal conclusion about the judge's impartiality; the conclusion must be "reasonable" to a hypothetical outside observer.

Second, saying as some cases do, that judges must avoid even "the appearance of impropriety" adds nothing to the analysis. Unless the "appearance" is required to be found reasonable by the same hypothetical outside observer, the system would become one of preemptory challenges of judges. That is not the system we have, nor would it be one that guarantees the judicial authority and independence on which justice ultimately depends.

Third, there is no dispute that judges may not hear cases in which they would receive a personal financial benefit if they were to decide for one party over another. The first case cited (albeit not by name) by Professors Gillers, Luban & Lubet was *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.*, 486 U.S. 847 (1988). It simply decided that a judge had a personal interest conflict and could not decide a case that would financially benefit a university on whose Board of Trustees the judge sat. In short, the case says nothing relevant to Judge Roberts' conduct.

Fourth, a judge may not hear a case argued by a private firm or government office with which the judge is negotiating for employment. The reason again is obvious. That was the fact situation in the remaining two cases cited by Professors Gillers, Luban & Lubet in their *slate.com* article. The cases break no new ground and provide no new insights relevant to this discussion.

Critics of Judge Roberts suggest, however, that his "interviews" with the Attorney General and with members of the White House staff were analogous to private job interviews. That is simply not the case. A judge's promotion within the federal system has not been – and should not be – seen as analogous to exploration of job prospects outside of the judiciary.

Except for the Chief Justice, every federal judge is at least in principle a potential candidate for promotion to a higher status in the judiciary. One might argue that no district judge should ever be promoted to a court of appeals, and no court of appeals judge should be elevated to the Supreme Court, but long ago, we recognized that such an approach would deny the nation's highest courts the talents of some of our most experienced and able judges. One need only imagine the chaos it would cause if we were to say that no federal judge could hear a case involving the federal government because he or she might be tempted to try to please the people thinking about the judge's next role in the federal judiciary. Nothing in § 455 requires us to say that it would be "reasonable" to assume such temptation. We properly assume that judges decide cases on their merits and see their reputation for so doing as their basis for promotion, if any.

To be fair to the critics, they argue that a judge's situation might be different once actual "interviews" begin for the new position. The problem with that, of course, is that interviews are only a step beyond reading the judge's decisions in a file, interviewing observers of the judge's work, and the like. That kind of thing goes on all the time, including in the media. Further, all accounts suggest that several judges were being "interviewed" and that for most of the period of the interviews, there was not even a Supreme Court opening to fill. Assuming, as even Professors Gillers, Luban & Lubet do, that no improper pressure or discussion took place in the interviews themselves, it is hard to see that physically meeting with White House staff transforms what is inevitable and proper in the judicial selection process into something more suspect.

Again, even Professors Gillers, Luban & Lubet ultimately concede that Judge Roberts should not have had to withdraw from all cases brought by the government as the logic of their criticism would seem to suggest. They argue instead that the *Hamdan* was special. It was "important" to the Administration and therefore required special caution.

I respectfully suggest that an “importance” standard for disqualification could not provide sufficient guidance for the administration of the federal courts. Every case is important, at least to the parties. Furthermore, while some cases have greater media interest than others, and some are watched more closely by one interest group or another, every case before the D.C. Circuit that involves the federal government is there because high level Justice Department officials have concluded that the appeal is worth filing or resisting.

Saying that some cases are important and others are not ultimately reveals more about the speaker’s priorities than it does about the intrinsic significance of the case. Indeed, earlier this year, the Supreme Court decided *United States v. Booker* and *United States v. Fanfan* involving the Sentencing Guidelines. Few decisions have had more impact on the operation of federal courts in recent years, yet it was widely reported that Professor Gillers opined to Justice Breyer – correctly in my view – that he need not recuse himself even though his own work product as a former member of the Sentencing Commission arguably was indirectly at issue. Importance of the case was not the controlling issue for Professor Gillers then, and it is simply not a standard now that can clearly guide a judge as to which cases require disqualification and which do not.

Indeed, the critics of Judge Roberts’ remaining a part of the *Hamdan* panel overlook the fact that judges of the D.C. Circuit are assigned to the cases that they hear on a random basis. That randomness is part of the integrity of the court’s process and it guarantees that no panel can be “stacked” with judges favorable to one litigant or another. Weakening the standard for a reasonable appearance of impropriety, and making recusal turn on which litigants can place news stories accusing judges with of a lack of ethics would adversely affect the just outcomes of cases more than almost any other thing that might come out of the hearings on Judge Roberts’ confirmation.

In short, in my opinion, no reasonable observer can “reasonably question” the propriety of Judge Roberts’ conduct in hearing the *Hamdan* case. He clearly did not violate 28 U.S.C. § 455. Indeed, he did what we should hope judges will do; he did his job. He participated in the decision of a case randomly assigned to him. We should honor him, not criticize him, for doing so.

Respectfully,

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